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Abstract
When a proposition is established, it can be taken as evidence for other
propositions. Can the Bayesian theory of rational belief and action provide an
account of establishing? I argue that it can, but only if the Bayesian is willing
to endorse objective constraints on both probabilities and utilities, and willing
to deny that it is rationally permissible to defer wholesale to expert opinion. I
develop a new account of deference that accommodates this latter requirement.
§1
Introduction
This paper asks whether Bayesianism can provide an account of establishing. When
a proposition is established, it can be taken as evidence for other propositions. Since
Bayesianism is intended to explicate the relation between evidence on the one hand
and rational beliefs and decisions on the other, it is essential that Bayesianism is
able to accommodate the generation of new evidence.
This question is distinct from the question of whether Bayesianism can provide
an account of acceptance. As Kaplan (1981) pointed out, acceptance is not a state of
certainty: one can accept a proposition as a basis for action without fully believing
the proposition thereafter. For example, one can accept Newton’s laws of motion
when performing some simple engineering task, yet it is reasonable to believe these
laws to a very low degree—even to degree zero—given that they have been falsified
and superseded by more complex laws. When a proposition is established, on the
other hand, one ought to fully believe it: it is a core tenet of Bayesianism that
one ought to fully believe one’s evidence. Therefore, the literature on rational
acceptance is largely concerned with a different phenomenon to that considered
here. A similar point can be made about the literature on the relationship between
qualitative belief and degree of belief: we would be reasonable to give many of our
qualitative beliefs credence less than 1, if pressed. My (qualitative) belief that it will
rain in Canterbury in the next week is well justified, yet it would be reasonable to
give this proposition credence less than 1 and it would not be appropriate for me to
treat it as evidence. Hence, believing is also distinct from establishing.
The paper is structured as follows. §2 explains the problem, as well as the scope
and presuppositions of this paper. §3 shows that the Bayesian account of establish-
ing is essentially decision-theoretic. §4 argues that, to be viable, this account must
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admit objective constraints on rational degrees of belief. §5 argues that it must
also admit substantive constraints on utilities. §6 argues that a viable account of
establishing must also avoid wholesale deference to expert beliefs, and develops a
new account of discounted deference. §7 takes stock and considers some potential
objections. Appendices 1 and 2 show that the analyses of §3 and §5 continue to
hold in a more complex decision-making setting.
§2
Bayesianism, evidence and establishing
This paper will remain neutral about the nature of evidence. Some suggest that
your evidence is what you know (Williamson, 2000), others that your evidence is
constituted by your true beliefs (Mitova, 2017), or your credences that are set by
observation (Jeffrey, 2004), or your information (Rowbottom, 2014), or what you
rationally grant (Williamson, 2015). Each of these theories will have something to
say about what it is to establish a proposition; however, the claims made in this
paper are independent of which of these theories is true, if any.
Bayesianism is concerned with the questions of when the strengths of an agent’s
beliefs, and the decisions informed by these degrees of belief, are rational. The
answer it provides to the latter question is known as Bayesian decision theory and
is sketched in §3, while the answer it provides to the former question is known as
Bayesian probability theory or Bayesian epistemology and is described in §4.
There are two perspectives one might have on these questions. The usual per-
spective is that of the deliberating agent herself, interested in determining how
strongly to believe certain propositions and which acts to choose in certain decision
problems. Under this actor’s perspective, Bayesianism is a practical theory; ‘to us,
probability is the very guide of life’ (Butler, 1736, p.xxv). An alternative perspective
is purely theoretical: concerned with what it takes for certain degrees of belief and
decisions to be rational, but not engaged with determining rational degrees of belief
or making decisions.
On either perspective, degrees of belief are deemed rational if they are appro-
priate given the evidence. The various Bayesian norms, described in §4, explicate
what it is for degrees of belief to be appropriate given the evidence. The key dif-
ference between the two perspectives is that on the former, practical perspective,
the norms had better be followable and your evidence accessible, for otherwise
Bayesianism could offer little guidance. On the latter, theoretical perspective, there
may be no such requirement: some purely theoretical development of Bayesianism
might deem your degrees of belief to be irrational even if you are in no position to
determine your evidence, nor to follow Bayesian norms.
The theoretical perspective might presuppose an externalist account of evi-
dence, for example. Then we might distinguish your evidence in this externalist
sense from what you take to be your evidence (which we shall sometimes call ‘wyt-
tby evidence’ for short). From the practical perspective, your degrees of belief are
rational iff they conform to the Bayesian norms given wyttby evidence, as long as
you are rational to take as your evidence what you take to be your evidence and
you are in a position to follow the Bayesian norms.
This paper will adopt the usual practical perspective—Bayesianism as a guide
to life. For this reason, we will focus on wyttby evidence, rather than some more
theoretical notion of evidence.
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For the purposes of this paper, we can be flexible about the kinds of proposi-
tions that can constitute rational wyttby evidence. In addition to past observations,
evidence might include reasonable presuppositions, universal laws and even state-
ments about the future. For example, you might take a proposition about the timing
of tomorrow’s tides as evidence that bears on your decision as to when to forage
for oysters. Butler has something to say about when to take such a proposition as a
‘moral certainty’:
Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by
this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the high-
est moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed
say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it;
because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a question, there
may be some against it; and though there be not, yet a slight presump-
tion does not beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying
a thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presumption is
of the nature of a probability, appears from hence; that such low pre-
sumption often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a
man’s having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some
sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen
again to-morrow: but the observation of this event for so many days,
and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind,
gives us a full assurance that it will. (Butler, 1736, p.xxiv)
Butler’s discussion highlights two key features of establishing. First, in order to
establish a proposition, strength of belief in that proposition must meet a substantial
threshold. After all, the proposition needs to become evident. Second, there must
be enough evidence to make this degree of belief sufficiently stable—to establish is
to render stable or firm. We will refer to these two key features as threshold and
stability respectively.1
One can also distinguish between establishing as an act and establishing as
an evidential relation. Where establishing is an act, it is a subject S that estab-
lishes proposition A. Where establishing is an evidential relation, it is a set E of
propositions that establishes proposition A.
Here is an example of the act of establishing: CERN established in 2012 that
they had observed a new particle in the mass region around 125 GeV. It is not always
obvious whether a statement refers to the act of establishing or to the evidential
relation. For example, ‘It is not yet established that this particle was the Higgs
boson’, might be read either as a statement about the act of establishing (no one
has yet established that this was the Higgs boson, nor is anyone yet in a position
to do so) or as a statement about the evidential relation (current evidence does not
establish that this was the Higgs boson). Plausibly, this ambiguity exists because
the act and the evidential relation are closely connected. One might think of the
act of establishing A as the act of taking A to be established by wyttby evidence,
1Skyrms (1977) offers a formal explication of stability, which he calls ‘resiliency’. We do not need
to commit to any particular formal notion of stability here: all that is required is the observation that
establishing A may be reasonable when one’s degree of belief in A reaches a high threshold and is likely
to remain above that threshold, but unreasonable should one’s degree of belief be very volatile over
time and unlikely to remain above the high threshold. See Parkkinen et al. (2018, §3.2) for discussion of
threshold and stability in the context of establishing causal claims in medicine, and Leitgeb (2017) for a
discussion of stability in relation to the connection between degree of belief and qualitative belief.
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in which case you are rational to establish A iff wyttby evidence establishes A. On
the other hand, one might argue that E establishes A iff taking E as evidence puts
you in a position to establish A.
Given the perspective on Bayesianism taken in this paper—using wyttby evi-
dence as a guide to life—the act of establishing will be of primary interest.
Clearly, a contingent proposition cannot be established by evidence that has no
bearing whatsoever on its truth. This platitude extends to the act of establishing, in
virtue of the connection between the act and the evidential relation: it is not ratio-
nally permissible to establish a contingent proposition in the absence of evidence
that bears on its truth. We will refer to this feature of establishing as non-vacuity.
Non-vacuity does not imply that one cannot take any proposition as evidence for
purely pragmatic reasons—merely that such a proposition cannot be said to be
established by prior evidence. To assume that all evidence must be established by
prior evidence would lead to a kind justificatory regress, and no such assumption
will be made here. We will return to non-vacuity in §4.
The final observation to make is that the act of establishing is fallible. For
example, it is quite possible that although CERN established in 2012 that they had
observed a new particle, as it turns out, they were mistaken. There are various
ways in which such an act of establishing might fail. Perhaps, wyttby evidence E at
that time did not, after all, establish the existence of the new particle. For example,
perhaps CERN were irrational to take existence of the particle to be established by
what they took to be their evidence because their statistical analysis was flawed. Or
perhaps they were irrational to take E as evidence in the first place. Externalism
about evidence opens up a further possibility: that CERN were rational to take
E as evidence, but as a matter of fact E was erroneous and did not correspond
to their evidence in the externalist sense, which did not establish existence. In
which case, CERN were rational to establish existence from the practical Bayesian
perspective, but not from the theoretical perspective. A proponent of a theoretical
perspective might even deem the evidential relation of establishing to be factive.
Then a fourth possibility arises: E qualifies as evidence in the externalist sense and
strongly confirms the existence of the particle, but as a matter of fact the particle
does not exist.
Given the practical perspective adopted here, we shall focus on the first of these
four kinds of error. Assuming that it is rational to take wyttby evidence E as
evidence, we shall ask when it is rational to establish a proposition A on the basis
of E. In the next section we see that Bayesianism provides a precise answer to this
question. In subsequent sections I argue that this answer imposes strong constraints
on Bayesianism itself.
§3
A decision-theoretic criterion
Since the act of establishing is an act, it falls under the remit of Bayesian decision
theory. Bayesian decision theory says that you should choose, out of a range of
acts, one that maximises expected utility. The probabilities used to calculate the
expected utility of each act are your degrees of belief in relevant states of the world.
The first step is to determine the utility of each act in each state of the world.
In the simplest case of establishing, there are two acts—establish A, don’t establish
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A—and the utility of each act depends on whether A is true or false:2
A A¯
establish A sA e A¯
don’t establish A eA s A¯
Here sA is the utility of successfully establishing A, i.e., of establishing A when
A is true; eA is the utility of erroneously failing to establish A, i.e., of not estab-
lishing A when A is true; s A¯ is the utility of successfully not establishing A, i.e., of
not establishing A when A is false; and e A¯ is the utility of erroneously establishing
A, i.e., of establishing A when A is false. It is important to keep in mind that the
act of not establishing A is different to the act of establishing A¯. Deciding, on the
basis of wyttby evidence, not to establish the existence of a new particle in the mass
region around 125 GeV is not the same as deciding to establish that there is no new
particle in that mass region.
Bayesian decision theory says that you ought to establish A iff the expected
utility of establishing A is greater than that of not establishing A:
P(A)sA +P(A¯)e A¯ > P(A)eA +P(A¯)s A¯ ,
where P is your personal probability function, which captures your rational degrees
of belief. This condition is met just when
P(A)> s A¯ − e A¯
(sA − eA)+ (s A¯ − e A¯)
,
since P(A¯) = 1−P(A). The right-hand side of this inequality defines a threshold
above which A ought to be established. We shall denote this threshold by τA . sA−
eA is the advantage in establishing A when A is true; call this the ‘true advantage’.
s A¯ − e A¯ is the advantage in not establishing A when A is false; call this the ‘false
advantage’. Then,
τA =
false advantage
true advantage + false advantage
While Bayesian decision theory deems establishing A to be rationally required
when P(A)> τA , it deems establishing A to be rationally permissible when P(A)≥
τA . If P(A) = τA , not establishing A is also rationally permissible, as the two
options have the same expected utility. If P(A) < τA , establishing A is rationally
impermissible.3 The criterion for establishing A can be expressed in terms of odds:
you are rationally required to establish A iff your odds for A exceed the ratio of the
false advantage to the true advantage.
In sum, the decision-theoretic aspects of Bayesianism impose a particular cri-
terion for establishing A. Thus Bayesianism offers a precise guide to establishing,
2In more complicated decision problems, there may be more options, or the options may depend
on more than just the truth of A. We focus here on the simplest case, set out in this section, for two
reasons. Firstly because already the simplest case forces some interesting constraints on Bayesianism,
as we will see in subsequent sections. Second, as is demonstrated in Appendix 1, the analysis presented
here is robust under a natural complexification of the decision problem, in which establishing A¯ is also
included as an extra option.
3If the sum of the false advantage and the true advantage is zero, then the threshold is not well
defined and the decision-theoretic account offers no guidance. For ease of exposition, we set this case
aside in what follows.
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and any violation of this decision rule would violate the norms of Bayesianism. Any
more detailed Bayesian analysis of establishing must validate this decision rule, on
pain of inconsistency.
§4
Subjective degrees of belief?
Most philosophical proponents of Bayesianism advocate a subjective version of
Bayesianism, according to which it is rationally permissible to adopt any degree
of belief in a contingent proposition A, in the absence of evidence that bears on the
truth of A. Interestingly, the Bayesian account of establishing rules out subjective
Bayesianism, as we shall see in this section.
In addition to norms on decision making, Bayesianism offers a guide to setting
initial degrees of belief and to changing degrees of belief in the light of new ev-
idence. With respect to the former task, norms can be divided into three kinds.
Firstly, there is some structural norm, which provides constraints on the struc-
ture of degrees of belief. Standardly, this says that degrees of belief should be
probabilities—representable by a probability function PE defined over the domain
of expressible propositions. Second, there are also evidential norms, which ensure
that rational degrees of belief are appropriately constrained by evidence. For exam-
ple: PE(A)= 1 if E logically implies A. Most Bayesians also maintain that degrees
of belief should be calibrated to chances where available: PE(A)= x if E says that
the chance of A is x, as long as there is no other evidence in E that defeats this
ascription of degree of belief; we will refer to this sort of evidential norm as a cal-
ibration norm. Another sort of evidential norm (a deference norm) requires, or at
least permits, deference to an appropriate expert in the absence of other relevant
evidence: PE(A) = x if E says that some rational expert believes A to degree x,
as long as there is no other evidence in E more pertinent to A. Third, there are
equivocation norms, which ensure that rational degrees of belief are equivocal in
the absence of evidence, but which are not endorsed by all Bayesians. For example:
PE(A)= 0 or 1 only if forced by evidence or by the axioms of probability. Another
sort of equivocation norm requires that PE(A) = 1/2 if there is no evidence that
bears on the truth of A, where A is a contingent atomic proposition (this is a ver-
sion of the principle of indifference). This norm is often generalised to require that
PE be the probability function with maximum entropy from all those that satisfy
structural and evidential norms (the maximum entropy principle). The adoption
of an equivocation norm is a feature that distinguishes objective Bayesianism from
subjective Bayesianism: these norms can substantially limit the scope for subjective
choice with respect to initial degrees of belief.
Although subjective Bayesianism stops short of equivocation norms, it does im-
pose strong constraints on changes to degrees of belief. The standard approach
here is to take PE(·) to be a conditional probability function, P(·|E). Then, on
new evidence F that is compatible with E, subjective Bayesians argue that your
degree of belief in A should change from PE(A) = P(A|E) to PEF (A) = P(A|EF)
(Bayesian conditionalisation). Thus the ‘prior’ probability function P(·|·) fully deter-
mines all ‘posterior’ degrees of belief. Some objective Bayesians advocate Bayesian
conditionalisation (e.g., Jaynes, 2003) while others reject the identification of condi-
tional beliefs with conditional probabilities and argue that degrees of belief should
be updated by reapplying the maximum entropy principle to the new evidence
(Williamson, 2010). We will not need to decide between these approaches to updat-
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ing here. We shall just note that on the former approach, the norm that requires
calibration of degrees of belief to chances is called the ‘principal principle’.
Having introduced the key norms of Bayesian epistemology, we shall now see
that the Bayesian account of establishing requires some equivocation norm. Con-
sider a simple example. Suppose A says that Angie has Angiostrongylus infection,
that the threshold for establishing A, τA , is 0.9, and that there is no evidence
available that bears on the truth of A. In the absence of such evidence, subjective
Bayesianism would deem any degree of belief in A to be rationally permissible. In
particular, PE(A)= 0.91 is rationally permissible. But if you do adopt this degree
of belief then PE(A) > τA and you ought to establish A and treat it as evidence
for other propositions, such as the proposition that Angie has meningitis; estab-
lishing A would also motivate particular treatment decisions. Clearly, however, it is
not rationally permissible to take A as established in the total absence of evidence
that bears on the truth of A: this is the platitude of non-vacuity, introduced in §2.
Since subjectivism fails to validate this platitude, it fails to offer a viable account
of establishing. Some normative constraint is required to ensure that PE(A)< 0.9,
that is, to ensure that this degree of belief is sufficiently equivocal in the absence of
evidence that bears on the truth of A. This is an objective Bayesian constraint.
One might object to this argument as follows: here we cannot assume a total
absence of evidence relevant to A, because the Bayesian decision-theoretic account
of establishing presupposes a utility matrix and these utilities tell us something
about preferences relating to A, so they provide evidence relevant to A. However,
this objection misses the mark: the above argument does not assume a total absence
of information pertaining to A, but rather an absence of evidence that bears on the
truth of A. The utilities of establishing and of not establishing A do not provide
evidence that A is true, nor evidence that A is false. Therefore, these utilities do
not on their own provide grounds for establishing A. Grounds for establishing A
must be grounds for taking A to be true: they must provide evidence for A, not
merely evidence that concerns A.4
§5
Subjective utilities?
So far, we have seen that a Bayesian account of establishing requires objective
constraints on degrees of belief that force non-extreme values in the absence of
evidence. This goes against the dominant philosophical view of Bayesianism, which
is subjectivism. Another tenet that Bayesians hold dear is that utilities are subjective:
although there are normative structural constraints on preferences or utilities, the
preference relations or utility values themselves are personal, with any utilities that
satisfy the structural norms being rationally permissible (see, e.g., Savage, 1954).
4These considerations point to another potential disanalogy between believing (in the qualitative
sense, rather than the quantitative, Bayesian sense) and establishing. Some suggest that utilities alone can
provide grounds for qualitative belief—e.g., Pascal put forward his famous wager to argue for believing
that God exists, purely on the basis of a comparison of the utilities of believing and of not believing.
In contrast, it is not plausible to suggest that utilities alone can provide grounds for establishing. In
particular, one cannot rationally establish that God exists in the absence of evidence that bears on the
truth of whether God exists. That this is so can be seen by appealing to the connection between the
act of establishing and the corresponding evidential relation: to establish a proposition is to imply that
the proposition is true, so far as one can tell from the evidence. Since evidence that does not bear on
the truth of God’s existence does not establish God’s existence, it is rationally impermissible to establish
God’s existence without evidence that bears on the truth of God’s existence.
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We will see in this section that the Bayesian account of establishing challenges this
tenet too.
Consider a possible subjective utility matrix (relating, as usual, to a contingent
atomic proposition A):
A A¯
establish A 10 −3
don’t establish A −10 2
Here, the false advantage is 5 and the true advantage is 20, so the threshold for
establishing is 5/25, τA = 0.2. Suppose again that you have no evidence that bears
on the truth of A. In such a case, any Bayesian—subjective or objective—will deem
PE(A) = 0.5 to be rationally permissible. But such a value passes the threshold
for establishing, so, if you do have this degree of belief, a Bayesian account of
establishing requires that you establish A, adding it to your evidence and fully
believing it thereafter. This cannot be right: by non-vacuity, it is not rationally
permissible to establish a proposition in the total absence of evidence that bears on
the truth of that proposition. Thus the above utility matrix is pathological, leading
to irrationality, and must be deemed rationally impermissible.
In order to avoid this problem, we clearly need a higher threshold for establish-
ing: the threshold will need to be greater than 12 , at the very least. Now, τA > 12
just when s A¯ − e A¯ > sA − eA , i.e., just when
false advantage > true advantage.
To be viable, then, a Bayesian account of establishing needs to impose this norma-
tive constraint on utilities.
This is perhaps surprising, because there does not seem to be anything wrong
with the above utility matrix from a subjective point of view: it simply represents
the utilities of someone who sees more advantage in establishing A when it is
true than in not establishing A when it is false. Indeed, it is not the Bayesian
connection between degrees of belief and decisions that renders this utility matrix
impermissible. Its impermissibility only comes to light when the act of establishing
enters the mix: Bayesianism concerns evidence as well as degree of belief and
decision making, and it turns out that this further normative constraint is required
if Bayesianism is to accommodate the non-vacuity of establishing.
Although it might be surprising that there is the need for such a normative
constraint, the constraint itself is descriptively quite plausible. First, it is plausible
that e A¯ is much less than eA : it is normally much worse to take a false proposi-
tion as evidence than not to take a true proposition as evidence. Taking a false
proposition as evidence removes it from contention and enables it to be used as
evidence for other propositions, with the potential to lead to many more erroneous
inferences. On the other hand, failing to take a true proposition as evidence has
only a mild impact on the intellectual economy: some time and effort may be spent
in keeping it under scrutiny and evaluating its probability, and one may miss out
on some sound inferences while it is being evaluated. Second, it is often plausible
that s A¯ is of similar magnitude to sA . Establishing A when true is good for the
intellectual economy because resources need no longer be devoted to its evaluation
and because it offers opportunities for new sound inferences. On the other hand,
keeping A under scrutiny when it is false is good because it leaves open the pos-
sibility that A¯ might be established in the future, and in the meantime, inferences
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will be based on proper assessment of its probability. If, indeed, e A¯ is much less
than eA but s A¯ is of similar magnitude to sA , then the false advantage will exceed
the true advantage, as the normative constraint on utilities requires.
The upshot is that a Bayesian account of establishing requires non-structural
constraints on utilities. One can provide a general argument for this conclusion
as follows. Suppose for reductio that there are no non-structural constraints on
utilities. Consider a case in which there is no evidence that bears on the truth of
A. Since by assumption there are no non-structural constraints on utilities, it is
rationally permissible to have a utility matrix for establishing A that is the same
as the utility matrix for A¯, and in which the false advantage is no greater than
the true advantage. In which case, the threshold τA for establishing A and the
threshold τA¯ for establishing A¯ are both no greater than
1
2 . Now, one of P(A) and
P(A¯)= 1−P(A) must be 12 or greater. Hence it is deemed permissible to establish
at least one of A, A¯. But this contradicts non-vacuity. Therefore, there must be
non-structural constraints on utilities after all.5
Suppose, then, that the false advantage is some multiple of the true advantage,
s A¯ − e A¯ = x(sA − eA) where x> 1. Then
τA =
x
x+1 .
The following table provides examples of thresholds for establishing that corre-
spond to various possible values of x:
x τA
1.5 0.6
2 2/3
3 0.75
9 0.9
19 0.95
99 0.99
§6
Stability and deference
§6.1. The deference problem
We have seen that both probabilities and utilities require objective constraints if
Bayesianism is to provide a viable account of the act of establishing. In this section
we will investigate a rather different question. We observed in §2 that establishing
requires stability of belief in addition to threshold belief. On the Bayesian account,
however, the decision to establish A seems to depend only on whether the degree
of belief in A meets a threshold (τA , defined in §3). The question then arises as
to whether the Bayesian account of establishing can adequately accommodate the
need for stability of degree of belief.
Consider an example. Suppose that nothing in evidence E bears on the truth of
whether Angie has Angiostrongylus infection (proposition A), and your threshold for
establishing A is 2/3. Suppose, next, proposition Y : a doctor says that she believes
A to degree 0.67. Let us assume for the moment that it is rationally permissible to
5Appendix 2 shows that this argument also goes through when establishing A¯ is included alongside
establishing A as an explicit option in the decision problem.
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defer to the expert and calibrate your own degree of belief to hers, and you do so,
setting PYE(A)= 0.67. The Bayesian account then says that you ought to establish
A. This is problematic if your degree of belief in A is likely to be volatile in the
light of further evidence.
Your degree of belief in A might be volatile where the doctor’s evidence, al-
though more extensive than your own, is nevertheless somewhat limited—e.g.,
where new test results are due which are likely to lead to substantial changes to
her degree of belief, and thus to your own degree of belief should you continue to
defer to her. Alternatively, it may be the case that the doctor’s expertise, although
greater than your own, is nevertheless rather limited, and that you will shortly defer
to a consultant who is more of a specialist in the area and who will be providing
an opinion in due course. Either way, if it is likely that your degree of belief will
change, then there is a significant chance that it will soon fall below the threshold
for establishing A.
In such a scenario, the Bayesian account has it that you are in a position now
to establish A but there is a substantial chance that shortly you should not take A
to be established. This is problematic because it conflicts with the stability con-
dition for establishing: when you establish a proposition you add it to your stock
of evidence and, while establishing is fallible, you would not expect to revisit that
proposition and revoke its status as evidence, at least in the short term. To say ‘we
have established the existence of a new particle but we are not confident that we
will take it to be established tomorrow’ is little short of Moore-paradoxical.6 The
ideal that, once established, a proposition remains in the evidence base is a funda-
mental Bayesian presupposition, underlying the use of Bayesian conditionalisation
to update degrees of belief in the light of new evidence, for example. In order to
conditionalise, the evidence base can only grow—Bayesian conditionalisation says
nothing about what to do if some item of evidence is revoked; it only offers a guide
to life when evidence is stable.
This problem for the Bayesian account of establishing arose because we assumed
that it is rationally permissible to defer unequivocally to the degrees of belief of an
expert, even when those degrees of belief are based on limited evidence or where
the expertise itself is limited (as is invariably the case in practice). To avoid the
problem, then, we must avoid this assumption, in the hope of developing a version
of Bayesianism in which stability of degree of belief is required for a degree belief
to surpass a threshold for establishing. Only if such a version of Bayesianism
is possible will the Bayesian account of establishing capture the requirement of
stability of degree of belief in addition to that of threshold degree of belief.
Thus, Bayesianism needs what might be called ‘discounted deference’: a princi-
pled way of ensuring that it is not normally permissible to defer fully to an expert’s
degree of belief, but that it is nevertheless rational to be influenced to some extent
by that degree of belief. What is needed is a compromise between a wholesale
adoption of the doctor’s degree of belief, 0.67, and being fully equivocal, repre-
sented by degree of belief 0.5, which one might adopt if there is no evidence at all
that bears on the truth of A (in particular, if there is no evidence of the base rate
of Angiostrongylus infection). The need for this compromise could be motivated by
the thought that one should not defer fully to anything but chance.
6This paradox is not the preface paradox: it may be reasonable to say that we are confident that some
proposition we have established will be revoked in due course, even though it would not be reasonable to
say of any particular established proposition that we have substantial confidence that it will be revoked.
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Bayesians who identify conditional beliefs with conditional probabilities might
attempt to accommodate discounted deference by applying the theorem of total
probability. Where Y says that the expert believes A to degree 0.67 and Xx says
that the chance of A is x,
P(A|YE)=
∫
x
P(A|Y XxE)P(Xx|YE) dx
Now, the truth of A is already determined, so its chance is 0 or 1. Hence,
P(A|YE) = 0 ·P(X0|YE)+1 ·P(X1|YE)
= P(X1|YE)
= P(A|YE)
So the theorem of total probability offers no substantive constraint in this case.
The theorem of total probability offers no help even if A is a proposition whose
chance is not 0 or 1. In this case,
P(A|YE) =
∫
x
P(A|Y XxE)P(Xx|YE) dx
=
∫
x
xP(Xx|YE) dx
because the principal principle implies that P(A|Y XxE) = x. Thus to apply the
theorem of total probability here, one needs to specify the values P(Xx|YE) for all
x ∈ [0,1]. This distribution can be thought of as a representation of the perceived
reliability of the expert. There are two problems with this proposal. First, specify-
ing all these values is a big ask of the deliberating agent. If Bayesianism is to be
a practical guide to life, it would be better not to have to specify all these values.
Second, there is no guarantee that this proposal will lead to discounted deference.
If there is no evidence of the expert’s reliability, the probabilities P(Xx|YE) are not
constrained by any evidential norm. According to subjective Bayesianism, any val-
ues for these probabilities are rationally permissible. Thus on a subjective Bayesian
account there is no guarantee that P(A|YE) takes a value between 0.5 and 0.67.
Without such a guarantee, non-vacuity would still be violated: it would be deemed
rationally permissible to establish A in the absence of evidence that bears on the
truth of A. On an objective Bayesian account, on the other hand, one would need to
specify some equivocal distribution on the unit interval to specify P(Xx|YE). Now,
determining an equivocal distribution over a continuous domain is problematic at
the best of times (see, e.g., Keynes, 1921), but in this case the task is harder still
because that equivocal distribution needs to embody some default assumption of
reliability of the expert. Just specifying a uniform distribution on the unit interval
will yield a value of 0.5 for P(A|YE), which fails to accommodate the fact that it
is rationally permissible to be influenced to some positive degree by a competent
expert. Arguably, one should give more credence to the claim that the chance of A
is within an interval around 0.67 than to the claim that it is in an interval of the
same size around 0.33, say, on the basis of Y . But if, as is plausible, the reliabil-
ity distribution P(Xx|YE) is symmetric around 0.67, then P(A|YE) will take the
value 0.67, which constitutes wholesale deference rather than discounted deference.
Therefore, on either a subjective or an objective version of Bayesianism, an appeal
to the theorem of total probability fails to offer an account of discounted deference
that overcomes the problem of stability.
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There is, however, another option for developing an account of discounted def-
erence. The approach taken here is to treat the problem of discounted deference
as analogous to the problem of determining inductive probabilities and to modify
a solution to the inductive problem that was developed in Williamson (2013) and
Williamson (2017, Chapter 7) so that it can solve the problem of discounted defer-
ence. First, in §6.2, I introduce the inductive problem and the proposed solution;
then in §6.3 I apply this solution to the deference problem.
§6.2. Determining inductive probabilities
The problem of determining inductive probabilities can be understood as follows.
A calibration norm such as the principal principle says that one should defer whole-
sale to chances, where these chances are available. In practice, however, we only
have imperfect evidence of chances, usually provided by taking a finite sample and
finding a proportion in that sample. Thus, to estimate the chance that Angie has
Angiostrongylus infection, one might consider the proportion of patients that have
Angiostrongylus infection in a sample of patients whose relevant characteristics are
similar to Angie’s. Unless that sample is very large, one should not defer wholesale
to the sample proportion. If the sample proportion is 0.67, for example, it would
be appropriate to adopt a degree of belief in A that is somewhere between 0.5 and
0.67, in absence of any other evidence that bears on the truth of A. The inductive
problem is the problem of determining exactly which value or values in this range
are appropriate.
The larger the sample size, the greater the influence of the sample proportion.
Perhaps at some point, the sample is so large that one is prepared to grant that the
sample proportion is an accurate estimate of the chance and fully defer to it via the
calibration norm. But in other situations, one is not prepared to grant this. In these
other situations, one can use an interval estimate instead of a point estimate: one
might be prepared to grant that the chance is within some interval around the sam-
ple proportion, even though one is not prepared to grant that the chance is equal to
the sample proportion. Confidence interval estimation methods are standardly used
to determine an interval estimate of a chance. The confidence level will depend on
the benefit of correctly estimating the chance and the cost of incorrectly estimating
the chance; I argue in Williamson (2017, Chapter 7) that Bayesian decision theory
can in principle be applied to choose the confidence level. Note that the confidence
level can be, and usually is, chosen in advance of collecting the sample: one makes
a commitment to grant that the chance is in the confidence interval determined
by the sample and the chosen confidence level, and that confidence interval is the
smallest interval for which one is prepared to grant this. Thus one commits to a
confidence level, and subsequently the sample yields a sample proportion and one
takes the chance to be within the corresponding confidence interval.
Suppose, then, that Ww says that a sample proportion pertinent to A is w and
suppose that other evidence E does not bear on A. Let I be the smallest closed
interval for which you are prepared to grant that the chance is in that interval.7 Af-
ter sampling you thus establish that the chance of A is in interval I; we denote this
established proposition by X I . Your new evidence is E′ = X IWwE. The principal
principle then forces your new degree of belief to lie in the interval I, PE′ (A) ∈ I.
7There is always some such interval, because you should be prepared to grant that the chance is at
least within the unit interval.
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This can be seen as follows:
P(A|X IWwE) =
∫
x∈[0,1]
P(A|X IWwXxE)P(Xx|X IWwE) dx
=
∫
x∈I
xP(Xx|X IWwE) dx
which is in I since P(Xx|X IWwE) ∈ [0,1] and
∫
x∈I P(Xx|X IWwE) dx = 1. Finally,
if, as argued in §4, an equivocation norm is in force, then PE′ (A) must take some
sufficiently equivocal value within the interval I, that is, a value in I near 0.5. (The
maximum entropy principle, for example, would, in the absence of other evidence,
choose the value in I that is closest to 0.5.) This procedure is depicted as follows:
0 10.5
PE(A)
wτA
PE′ (A) I
Here PE(A) = 0.5, since, it is supposed, E contains no evidence that bears on
the truth of A. E′ constrains your degree of belief in A to lie in the interval I
around the sample proportion w, and the most equivocal value—the lower end of
the interval—is the only appropriate value for PE′ (A) according to the maximum
entropy principle.8 Only if PE′ (A)> τA will it be appropriate to establish A. This
requires two things: that w > τA and that I is small enough that the lower end of
the interval I exceeds the threshold τA . This second condition will be met only if
the confidence interval is sufficiently small:
0 10.5
PE(A)
wτA
PE′ (A) I
Since it is established that the chance of A is in the interval I, future degrees of
belief in A can be expected to remain in this interval: in that sense, they are stable.
Thus we see that, in the inductive case, A is established only if the threshold is met
and there is sufficient stability of degrees of belief.
§6.3. A deference principle
Having seen how the stability requirement can be accommodated in the context of
the problem of determining inductive probabilities, we shall now see that this kind
of approach can be applied to the analogous problem of discounted deference. This
will allow us to alleviate the concern about stability raised in §6.1.
First we consider a principle governing wholesale deference that is analogous to
a calibration norm such as the principal principle. Let Zz say that a fully competent
8It is important to emphasise that PE′ (A) is a rational degree of belief, not an estimate of the
chance of A. w remains the best point estimate of the chance of A, but since this point estimate is a real
number, one should not give any positive credence to the proposition that the chance of A coincides
precisely with w. If all one is prepared to grant is that the chance is in the interval I, then the principal
principle only requires that one’s degree of belief should lie within that interval. The reasons for choosing
an equivocal value (a value close to 0.5) from within that interval are non-evidential (Williamson, 2018).
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and rational expert, with ideal evidence of A, ought to believe A to some degree
z. Then, a deference principle that is analogous to a calibration norm would force
PZzE(A)= z, as long as there is no evidence in E that overrides this ascription of
degree of belief. Here, ‘ideal evidence’ can be taken to consist of all the evidence
one would collect if the cost of evidence gathering were no object. (Ideal evidence
cannot be construed as all matters of fact up to the present time, because these
facts would include A or A¯ and the deference principle would trivialise.)
In practice, one is presented not with Zz, but Yy, the proposition that the actual
expert’s degree of belief is y. Nevertheless, as in the case of calibration to chance,
one might be prepared to infer something about the ideal value z from the actual
expert’s degree of belief y. Consider the smallest closed interval I for which one
is rational to establish ZI on the basis of YyE. (Trivially, one is at least rational to
establish Z[0,1] on the basis of YyE.) Letting E′ = ZIYyE and applying the idealised
deference principle, we have that PE′ (A) ∈ I, just as in the analogous case of the
principal principle, considered above. Applying an equivocation norm, PE′ (A) will
be a value in I near 0.5—the value closest to 0.5, according to the maximum
entropy principle. This yields an account of discounted deference that is closely
analogous to the account of induction presented above:
0 10.5
PE(A)
yτA
PE′ (A) I
Only if PE′ (A)> τA will it be appropriate to establish A:
0 10.5
PE(A)
yτA
PE′ (A) I
This requires both that y> τA and that I is sufficiently small. A small interval
I corresponds to a narrow range of values for the degree of belief z of a fully
competent and rational expert with ideal evidence of A. Since this ideal degree
of belief is the value to which one’s own degree of belief should defer and it is
established that z is in the narrow interval I, the expectation is that one’s own
degrees of belief will remain in this small interval. This is an expectation of stability
of degree of belief. Thus this approach overcomes the problem posed in §6.1: both
stability and threshold are features of establishing.
Two questions face this new account of discounted deference. First, how do we
calculate I? In the case of determining inductive probabilities, confidence interval
methods were natural, but here there is no obvious off-the-shelf statistical method.
One possible approach is to think of the doctor’s expertise as distilling experience
of previous patients—both her own experience and the experience passed on to
her through her training—and to think of her credence as a sample proportion
based on this sample of previous patients. If one can quantify the expertise of the
doctor by identifying some number n such that one would view a sample of size
n as equally informative about A as the expert’s degree of belief, one can then
exploit the analogy between discounted deference and the problem of determining
inductive probabilities and one can use confidence interval methods to choose I.
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As before, one might apply expected utility theory to determine a confidence level,
and one can determine a confidence interval by thinking of the agent’s credence y
as a proportion generated by a sample of size n.9
The second question that arises is: how does this new account of discounted
deference interact with a calibration norm such as the principal principle? One
might think that the principal principle should always trump deference to expert
belief, because chances, where one can obtain them, offer the best evidence one
could possibly hope for. Perhaps. However, we cannot normally obtain chances—
only estimates of chances. If we are indifferent between an expert’s opinion and a
proportion from a sample of size n, then, clearly, a sample proportion w generated
by a sample of size n should not simply trump the expert’s credence y, because
they are viewed as equally informative about A. In this case, we might think of
the evidence as containing two samples of size n and use statistical methods for
combining studies, such as meta-analysis, to generate a confidence interval based
on all the available evidence.
§7
Conclusions and objections
To sum up, Bayesianism can provide a viable account of establishing, but only
a particular kind of Bayesianism can. In order to provide a viable account of
establishing, one needs to accept non-evidential constraints on probabilities and
non-structural constraints on utilities, and one needs to accept that it is normally
impermissible to defer wholesale to an expert’s degrees of belief: one needs a
satisfactory account of discounted deference. One cannot get such an account of
discounted deference by applying the principle of total probability, but one can by
viewing deference as analogous the problem of determining inductive probabilities
and by adapting the approach of Williamson (2017). This yields a very idiosyncratic
version of Bayesianism: a version of objective Bayesianism that combines frequentist
and Bayesian methods and that is prescriptive about utilities. The challenge to
advocates of other versions of Bayesianism is: how can your versions yield viable
accounts of establishing?
We close by considering some possible objections to this account of establishing.
One might argue that establishing is not really an act and that Bayesian deci-
sion theory is therefore the wrong tool to apply. The thought here might be that it
is evidence that establishes a claim, not an agent. This objection is hard to mesh
with the practice of science, since establishing propositions appears to be the pri-
mary activity of scientists. If establishing were not an act, there would seem to be
very little for the scientist to do. This objection is also hard to reconcile with law,
medicine and other fields where establishing is a core activity, if not the primary
activity. In the account developed in §6.3, the agent is central is central to estab-
lishing: utilities are to some extent agent-relative, and hence so are the confidence
levels; moreover, judgements need to be made about the equivalence between an
expert’s opinion and a sample. In scientific contexts, there is room for debate about
these judgements and thus room to settle disagreements, but these judgements are
nonetheless attributable to the deliberating agent. Establishing is very much an act.
9One complication here is that y is the expert’s degree of belief, not her estimate of the chance of
A, and so y may be more equivocal than the expert’s best estimate of chance, particularly when the
expert has little or no evidence to go on. Thus this approach is most applicable where the expert has
plenty of relevance experience and evidence.
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A related worry is that establishing may not be an intentional act: perhaps
establishing is a subconscious act and we have no control over what we establish,
in which case Bayesian decision theory may yet be the wrong tool to apply. Two
considerations help to alleviate this worry. First, while some acts of establishing
may be performed subconsciously, not all are. To take a concrete example, the
International Agency for Research on Cancer assesses whether certain chemicals
and other agents are carcinogenic: at review meetings, one subgroup of reviewers
explicitly decides whether they can establish from epidemiological studies that the
agent causes cancer in humans, while another subgroup decides whether they can
establish from animal studies that the agent causes cancer in experimental animals
(IARC, 2019, pp. 31–32). These explicit decision problems are common in science
and medicine, and Bayesian decision theory is applicable to such situations. Sec-
ond, even in cases of unintentional establishing, it can be helpful to consciously
re-evaluate these cases. While a hallucination may subconsciously cause one to
establish the presence of giant spiders and to treat this proposition as evidence that
one should run away, it will be helpful to consciously re-evaluate this proposition in
due course. When the context changes, Bayesianism can offer a guide to life even
with respect to those propositions that, at first, one cannot help but strongly believe
or establish.
Another concern is that establishing is prone to standard problems that face
analyses of propositional attitudes in terms of threshold degrees of belief. For
example, it is sometimes suggested that a qualitative belief can be understood as
a degree of belief that meets an appropriate threshold. Such accounts are prone
to lottery and preface paradoxes, for instance. In the case of establishing, it may
be that one ought to establish A and one ought to establish B but one ought not
to establish AB, if PE(A) > τA and PE(B) > τB but PE(AB) < τAB. This appears
incongruous, not least because if one does establish A and one does establish B
then it will usually be at least permissible to establish AB, since PEAB(AB)= 1.
A similarly odd phenomenon arises with a lottery example. Suppose E specifies
a fair n-ticket lottery with a prize of 1000 som and a ticket cost of 1 som, and A i
says that ticket i loses. Suppose also that establishing A i would lead you not to buy
ticket A i , but that you commit to buy the smallest-numbered ticket that has not
been established to lose, if there are any such tickets. Initially (before any tickets
have been established to lose) the utility matrix for establishing A1 might look like
this:
A1 A¯1
establish A1 0 0
don’t establish A1 −1 999
Here, if ticket 1 loses (A1) then establishing that it loses will result in no loss or
gain, because it will not be purchased. Similarly, if it wins (A¯1) then establishing
that it loses will result in no gain or loss. If it is not established to lose, then
you will buy that ticket, in which case you will pay 1 and have an overall gain of
999 if that ticket wins. The threshold for establishing A1 is thus τA1 = 999/1000.
Equivocating, your credence that ticket 1 wins is 1/n, where n is the number of
tickets in the lottery, so PE(A1)= (n−1)/n. According to this analysis, you should
establish A1 if there are more than a thousand tickets, n> 1000.
Suppose you do indeed establish A1. Consider A2 next. The utility matrix is
the same, but now PEA1 (A2) = (n−2)/(n−1). In general, PEA1,...,Ak (Ak+1) = (n−
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k−1)/(n−k). There will come a point, then, when (n−k−1)/(n−k)< 999/1000; at
this point it will not be permissible to establish Ak+1. For example, if n= 2000 then
one should establish that the first 999 tickets lose, it is permissible to establish that
ticket 1000 will lose, but if one does also establish A1000 then it is not permissible to
establish A1001. This is a peculiar phenomenon, given that each ticket has exactly
the same probability of winning.
While this is not the place for a general discussion of lottery and related para-
doxes, which affect many theories in formal epistemology, it is worth noting that the
account of establishing developed here has one line of response that is not avail-
able to many other theories. To the extent that these phenomena are problematic
consequences of decisions to establish, they have negative utility. It is possible to
take this negative utility into account when deciding whether to establish a propo-
sition. Thus the utility matrices in the lottery example might be better represented
as follows:
A i A¯ i
establish A i −u −u
don’t establish A i −1 999
If u≥1 then τA i≥1 and for no i is it the case that one is rationally required to
establish A i . This avoids incurring the negative utility engendered by establishing
that some lottery tickets will lose, but not others.
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Appendix 1: Robustness of the analysis of §3
In this appendix we see that the lessons of the simple decision scenario of §3 also
hold of the more complex decision problem that arises when we include establishing
A¯ as an option.
We abbreviate the acts establish A and don’t establish A by 3A and 7A respec-
tively. The decision table for establishing A (from §3) is:
A A¯
3A sA e A¯
7A eA s A¯
We saw that this decision table requires establishing A when
P(A)> false advantage
true advantage + false advantage
The analogous decision table for establishing A¯ is:
A A¯
3A¯ e′A s
′
A¯
7A¯ s′A e
′
A¯
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By reasoning analogous to that of §3, in this modified decision problem one
ought to establish A¯ just when
P(A)< true
′ advantage
true′ advantage + false′ advantage
where the true′ advantage is s′
A¯
− e′
A¯
and the false′ advantage is s′A − e′A .
Now consider a more complex decision scenario in which one might establish
one or both of A, A¯. Arguably, one can represent this scenario as follows:
A A¯
3A 3A¯ −u −u
3A 7A¯ sA + s′A¯ e A¯ + e
′
A¯
7A 3A¯ eA + e′A¯ s A¯ + s
′
A¯
7A 7A¯ eA + s′A¯ s A¯ + e
′
A¯
One can often take utilities to be additive. However, if both A and A¯ are estab-
lished then evidence becomes inconsistent which has very negative utility, denoted
by −u in this table, where u is very large. The expected utility of 3A 3A¯ is then
−u, which, we may suppose, rules this option out of contention.
Given that this option is ruled out of contention, establishing A is rationally
required when the expected utility of 3A 7A¯ exceeds that of 7A 7A¯. It is not hard
to see that this is the case just when
P(A)> false advantage
true advantage + false advantage
That this concurs with the criterion derived from the first decision matrix set out
above shows that the analysis of §3 is robust under a natural complexification of
the decision problem.
Moreover, according to the modified decision scenario, establishing A¯ is ratio-
nally required when the when the expected utility of 7A 3A¯ exceeds that of 7A
7A¯. It is not hard to see that this is the case just when
P(A)< true
′ advantage
true′ advantage + false′ advantage
Again, this provides evidence of robustness of the analysis. Note that the same
points can be made about the rational permissibility of establishing A or A¯ if we
change the strict inequalities above to non-strict inequalities.
Appendix 2: Robustness of the analysis of §5
In this appendix we see that the general argument for the need for non-structural
constraints on utilities presented in §5 is robust under moving to the more complex
decision problem of Appendix 1.
Let us rerun the general argument in the context of the complex decision prob-
lem of Appendix 1, with the four options 3A 3A¯, 3A 7A¯, 7A 3A¯, 7A 7A¯.
Suppose for reductio that there are no non-structural constraints on utilities,
and consider a case in which there is no evidence that bears on the truth of A. By
assumption there are no non-structural constraints on utilities, so it is rationally
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permissible to have a utility matrix for establishing A that is the same as the utility
matrix for A¯. In the notation of Appendix 1,
s′A = s A¯ , e′A = e A¯ , s′A¯ = sA , e
′
A¯ = eA .
These constraints imply that:
true′ advantage = true advantage
false′ advantage = false advantage
By assumption it is also rationally permissible that the false advantage is no greater
than the true advantage:
false advantage ≤ true advantage
This latter inequality implies that:
false advantage
true advantage + false advantage
≤ 1/2≤ true advantage
true advantage + false advantage
From the analysis of Appendix 1, we see then that establishing A is rationally
permissible if P(A)≥1/2 and establishing A¯ is rationally permissible if P(A)≤ 1/2.
So whatever value P(A) takes, it is rationally permissible to establish at least one
of A and A¯. But this contradicts non-vacuity. Thus there must be non-structural
constraints on utilities after all.
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